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Architectural
Support for
Designing Fault-Tolerant
Open Distributed Systems
Salim Hariri and Alok Choudhary,

Syracuse University

Behcet Sarikaya, Bilkent University

A distributed voting
algorithm and a twolevel hierarchy for
permanent memory are
key elements in this
scheme for supporting
fault tolerance in open
distributed systems.
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distributed system consists of autonomous computing modules that interact with each other using messages. Designing distributed systems is more
difficult than designing centralized systems for several reasons. Physical
separation and the use of heterogeneous computers complicate interprocessor
communication, management of resources, synchronization of cooperating activities, and maintenance of consistency among multiple copies of information. The
main advantages of distributed systems include increased fault-tolerance capabilities through the inherent redundancy of resources, improved performance by
concurrently executing a single task on several computing modules, resource
sharing, and the ability to adapt to a changing environment (extensibility).’
Distributed systems cover a wide range of applications. Recent advances in
VLSI devices and network technology will further increase the use of distributed
systems. As the complexity of these systems increases, so does the probability of
component failure, which can adversely affect the performance and usefulness of
such systems. Thus, reliability, availability, and fault tolerance become important
design issues in distributed systems. Fault tolerance is the system’s ability to
continue executing despite the occurrence of failures. Increasing the reliability and
fault tolerance of a system involves a trade-off between the cost of failure (for
example, costs incurred by incomplete or incorrect computations) and the cost of
incorporating redundancy and recovery mechanisms.
Because of their inherent redundancy, distributed systems provide a costeffective way to apply fault-tolerance techniques. Open distributed systems provide universal connectivities among their components because their designs are
based on the standard protocols adopted by the International Standards Organization (ISO). In this computing environment, interacting processes communicate
through messages that traverse a stack of software layers. Consequently, applying
fault-tolerance
techniques to execute critical tasks can be costly in terms of
execution time.
In this article, we first provide an overview of the main techniques for designing
0018-9162/92/0600-0050$03.00
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fault-tolerant software and hardware systems. We identify the
important features of the building blocks (computers, memories, buses, etc.) that can support an efficient implementation
of fault-tolerant open distributed systems (FTODS). Taking
into account the features of these
building blocks, we propose an
organization
for FTODS. In
FTODS, the algorithms needed
for transferring files and synchronizing the concurrent activities of the computing modules
- and for recovery - are IS0
standard protocols. We propose
the use of low-level voting and
recovery algorithms that can run
as a layer of software above the
operating system to make the
open distributed system an attractive environment for applying fault-tolerant techniques.

Glossary of acronyms
AAT - Atomic action tree
ACSE - Association control service etement
ASE - Applk&ion ~rviee element
CCR - Commitment, concurrency, and recovery
DVA - Dtstrtbuted vating algorithm
FTAY - Ftle transfer and nrana~ent
PTMP - Fault-&Want muitipnxessor
P’TODS - Fault-toterant open distributed systems
HPM - HterarchW permanent memory
JTM -Job transfer and manipulation
MPM - Magnet& permanent memory
WTF - Mean time to failure
ODP - Open distributed processing
ODS - Open distributed systems
OSI - Open Systems tnterconnection
RDA - Remote database access
StFT - &&ware-imptemented fault tolerance
WU - Semiconductor permanent memory
TP - Traffsactk3n processing
Wt - Transaction reliabikty
VTP - Virtual terminai protocol

Design
considerations for
fault tolerance
Fault tolerance, a system’s ability to
continue executing its tasks despite the
occurrence of failures, can be achieved
by fault masking. Masking (also called
static redundancy) is incorporated into

the design to concurrently mask faults
and prevent their propagation to other
modules. The most common example of
static redundancy is the triple modular
redundant system. Another approach
for providing fault tolerance is dynamic
redundancy, which uses spare components to replace faulty modules once
they are detected. Still another approach
- a combination of these two, called

Strategies for designing fault-tolerant
Many techniques have been used to build fault-tolerant
computers. They include
Fault masking: Concurrent masking and correction of generated errors.
Fault defe@o#: Use of hardware and software mechanisms
to determine the Qccurrence of a failure. Fault detection
mechanisms include concurrent fault detection, stepwise comparison, and periodic testing to determine whether computers
or communication links are operating correctly.
Fault containment: Prevents propagatlun of errQneQus or
damaged information In the system after a fault occurs and
before it is detected.
F&t diagnosis: t&cates and identifies the faulty module responsible for a detected error.
Repair/recontisuration: Eliminates or replaces the faulty
module, or provides means to bypass it.
Fault recovery Corrects the system to a state acceptable
for continued operation.
Most of these techniques have been used to build such
computers as the Tandem 16 NonStop system, the Stratus

June 1992

hybrid redundancy - applies
static and dynamic redundancy
to achieve fault tolerance. In
general, the design of a faulttolerant computer involves one
or more of the following strategies: fault masking, fault detection, fault containment, fault
diagnosis, repairlreconfiguration, and fault recovery2 (see
the sidebar “Strategies for designing fault-tolerant
computers”).
Designing a fault-tolerant distributed system is more involved
than designing a fault-tolerant
centralized system. Two main
problems must be addressed
during design:
(1) Concurrency
control,
which involves scheduling concurrent execution of tasks on
different nodes such that their
results are identical to a serial
execution of the tasks (serializability requirement).
(2) Kedundancy management, which
involves preserving consistency among
replicated resources and maintaining
the state information with backup modules to support recovery.
Transactions are an important programming paradigm for simplifying the
design of reliable distributed applica-

computers
computer system, the VAXft 3000, the Teradata and Sequoia
systems, the fault-tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP), the software-impfemented fault-toterance (SIFT) system, and AT&T’s
Electronic Switch System (ESS).ls The effectiveness of faulttolerance techniques can be measured by the “coverage,” defined as the conditional probability of recwering from a fautt
once it occurs.3 It Is difficult to measure this param&X because it involves evaluating the probability that fauft detection, fault diagnosis, repairlrrrconfiguration, and recovery algorithms are aperating correctly.
References
1. D.P. Siewiorek and R.S. Swarz, The Theoryand Practiceof&IL
able System Ckwign Digital Press, Bedford, Mass., 1982.
2. D.P. Siewiorek, “Fault Tabrance in Commercial Computers;”
Computer, Vol. 23, No. 7, July lQQ0, pp. 28-37.
3. J.B. Dugan and KS. Trivedi, ‘Coverage Modeling of Fault-Toterant Systems,” IEEE Tmns. Computers, Vol. C-38, No. 6, June
1989, pp. 775-787.
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Transactions
A transaction can be defined as a collection
three properties’:
Failure atomicify: Either all operations
suits are undone when a failure occurs.
Permanence:

of operations

are performed

having the following

successfully

or their re-

The results of committed

transactions

will not be lost.

Serializability: The results of executing
as if they were executed serially.

transactions

concurrently

are the same

Use of the transaction concept to model distributed computations provides a
convenient means to solve the concurrency control and redundancy management
problems.’ The concurrency control problem consists of three tasks: assigning an
order to all transactions,
identifying conflicting transactions, and synchronizing
transactions to resolve the identified conflicts. Basically, there are three approaches to concurrency control: time-stamp-based
schemes, locking protocols,
and optimistic techniques.2

References
1, Distributed Systems, S. Mullender, ed., Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1989.
2. P.A. Bernstein, V. Hadzilacos, and N. Goodman, Concurrency Control and Recovery in
Database Systems, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1987.

tions (see the “Transactions” sidebar).
from all nodes before processing the
Techniques for managing redundancy
next transaction. The main problem with
and maintaining consistency of replithis scheme is that it permits no paralcated objects are broadly characterlelism among transaction executions.
ized as centralized- and decentralizedVoting algorithms have also been used
control algorithms. The centralizedto ensure consistency of replicated recontrol approach supports strong consources. In this scheme, managers of
sistency, requirements
and prevents
replicated resources use a common set
deadlocks, but it is susceptible to single
of rules to determine whether an uppoints of failure. The decentralized-condate can be made. The algorithm’s control approach supports weak
consistency requirements
(when it is permissible to
have the state of some replica out of date for a short
period of time), and therefore it can potentially increase a system’s throughput. The primary-copy
algorithm’ applies the centralized-control strategy to
ensure the consistency of
replicated resources. In this
scheme. one node is designated as the primary node
and made responsible for
serializing updates. When
the update values have been
computed, the primary node
broadcasts them to all other nodes in the system. The
primary node then waits to
Figure 1. The structure of an application layer.
receive acknowledgments
52

trol can be centralized or decentralized,
depending on whether the voting is done
at one site or multiple sites.’ In addition
to maintaining consistency of replicated resources, redundancy management
is responsible for system recovery in the
presence of node crashes and communication link failures.

Open distributed
systems
In this article, we investigate techniques for providing architectural support to improve the execution of distributed applications that use the Open
Systems Interconnection standards. The
main goal of the OS1 reference model is
to provide universal connectivity among
heterogeneous computers. The reference model is designed to structure communication hardware and software in a
layered architecture.’ IS0 committees
are working on an architecture in line
with the reference model for open distributed
processing (ODP). This effort
aims to combine the OS1 model with a
database model to arrive at a global
framework for designing distributed
systems. In such an environment, any
computer would be open for communication and could be integrated easily
with the existing distributed systems to
perform certain tasks. Implementation
of the communication protocols as layered software tends to be very slow and
consequently limits the scope of applications for open distrr%uted systems.
The application layer is
implemented as several application service elements
(ASEs),
with one ASE
serving them all. This element is called the association control service element
(ACSE). and it provides
association (connection) establishment/disconnection
service to other ASEs. In
open distributed systems,
distributedapplicationsare
implemented by the services that the ASEs provide.
The application layer services can be in the form of
file transfers
using the
FTAM (file transfer and
management) protocol, remote database access using
COMPUTER

the RDA protocol, job transfers using
the JTM (job transfer and manipulation) protocol, a virtual terminal using
the VT protocol, and transaction processing using the TP protocol.
To achieve reliable and fault-tolerant
computing in open distributed systems,
the ASEs use the commitment, concurrency, and recovery (CCR) services provided by a special ASE called the CCR
protocol.4 CCR is a standard two-phase
commit protocol that provides the services needed to achieve concurrency
control and recovery during execution
of application layer tasks such as FTAM,
TP, VTP, etc. Figure 1 shows the OS1

communication model and the interactions among the ASEs of the application layer.

Architectural
for FTODS

support

In this section we identify features
that should be supported by the computing modules of open distributed systems to facilitate an efficient implementation of fault-tolerant algorithms. On
the basis of this criteria, we propose an
organization for fault-tolerant open dis-

tributed systems, the architecture of its
building blocks, and the required algorithms and protocols. The architecture
of the computing modules should support reliable broadcasting, self-repair/
recovery, selective fault tolerance, and
permanent memory (see the sidebar
“FTODS computing module capabilities”).
Organization
of the FTODS. An
FTODS comprises a set of computing
modules we refer to as nodes. Nodes
communicate and interact with each
other by broadcasting their messages
on a redundant broadcast medium. A

FTODS computing module capabilities
The architecture of the computing modules should faciltate
the efficient implementation of fault-tolerant dgorithms. This
architectural support can be provid%d by the following capabilities:
Reliabk brcmdmksttng. Reliable broac&asting provides
means for a set of procasses to communicate in spite of failures and is used frequently as a priiitive operation to fmplement reliable distributed appliGation8.l it has been shown that
reliable broadcasting provides an efficient soft&ion to many
problems - for example, distributed consensus, distributed
synchronization, replicated update; and transaction management in database systems.* Furthermore, theee r&able pfotocols will run efficiently on the underlying architecture if its
communication n%twGrkhas a broadcast capab&ty.
S%if-~6pai~ke~ov%~. Recovery in distributed systems with
replicated resourcss, GOmputatlons, and database systems is
a nontrivial task. Moreover, the ov&!%ad of recovery can degrade system performanc% significantiy.2 Hardware recovery
blocks have been proposed to reduce overtmad during the
save operations of system state &nd to speed up recovery
when faults are de&&d in a mu&iproG%ssorsy&%m.3The titerature is rich with techniqt#s that can be used ttj support
self-repair and reG0vef-y.For exampie, the us% of static redundancy.to achieve fault masking has been used in’the
c.vmp (computer-voted multiprocessor) computer.* Atso, Kuhl
and Reddy” have addressed fauft,diagnosis at the system
level and the conditions under which nodes cefl diagnose the
failure of other nodes to achieve s&f-test.
The architecture of the computrng modules should support
a hierarchical approach for r%cOv%rysuch that mbst of the
time-consuming tasks are ex%Gut%dat a lower level of this hierarchy. The use of staticz(masking) redundancy and diagnostic routines simpl@iis the tasks involved in fault detection,
self-reconfiguration and repair, and recovery. Providing the
computing modules with these features cot&d sign$fkant#y reduce the complexity of recovery at the application Isvel. With
the proliferation of VLBI chips, I/O processors, eontiolters,
and memory, it is now reasonable to use redundant components in designing th8 computing modules.
Sekstive fault tobrane. Since not all task operations requite fault tolerance, it is desirabIe to run on[y the critical op-
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mode
and tile rest in a normal
erations in a Sault-tolerant
mode. This will lead to a signfficant imprcwement in peIfOfmance without compromising the fault-tdtrrance fequifements. Conseguentiy, the arGh&otur% Of the computing modules should support ~~~~,r~gu~~~n
such that the
processors Mthin a nod% can be canfigured for use as a
masking redundancy during eMGal operations and as a muitiprocessor system during noftG&Gal operations. This capabifity has been supported by the G.vmp, which contairis three
processor-memory pairs that can operate independently and
can also providot fault-&&rant 0p%rations.4

HhmmhW
pmnaqemt nxmwy aystesn. Most fecrrvsry
aigofithms needed to a~M?v%@Moferant computing rety on
permanent storage.’ St&&e st%f&ge is usad to stofe the
chsckpoints of a system stat%: these ch%ekpoints will b% used
to restore the system to the previous faoft-free checkpoint
state when a failure oc~ufs duthtg normal operation. Stable
storage is normally COnStrUCtedusing dual magnetic disks.
Performance of fautt-tolerant algorithms Gan be improved significantly if stab& morage is implemented in a twa-tevel hierarGhy in which sem&8nd&tGtorplsrnranen memory is used in
the first level and magnrttic permanent memory is us%d in the
second. The SPM acts ae a buffef b%twe%nthe professor
and the t&PM.
ft%fer%nG%s
1. u&ributed Sy&ms, 8. MutMUer, ed., Add&on-Wesley,Readtng, Mass., 1989.
2. J. Changand f&F. MsxemBwk,uRs&bts 6roatlcast Protocols,
ACM Tams. Com@#er@@ems,VG~.2, No. 3, Aug. 1984,pp.
251-273.
3. Y.-H. Ies and KG. Shfn, Qestgn and Evaluationof a Fault-Toler-

ant ~~

Using ~s~~~

Tram Computers, V#. G33,No.

2, Feb. lm,

EfJocks,”
MZE
pp. t13-124.

4. D.P. Siswiorekand R.S. Swsrz, The Theow and Pracriceof Reli-

ebbssystem Lwgn, @gitalPress,Seuford,Maas.,1982.
5. J.G. Kuhl and SM. F&d&y,%sutt4.Xsgnosisin Fully Distrsbutetd
Systems,”Pm@. 1l@ Iti‘i SJM~P.
Fs&-Toisrsnt Gompuffi@IEEE
CS Press,Los A&m&s, C&if., Order No. 350 (microficheonly),
June 1981,pp. lOO-f05.
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Figure 2. Organization of the fault-tolerant o p e n distributed system.

Figure 3. N o d e architecture.
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set ot n o d e s torms a cluster. A cluster
(C,) c o m m u n i c a t e s with another cluster
(C,) through the gateway associatedwith
e a c h cluster (see Figure 2).
N o d e architecture. E a c h n o d e hasseve r a 1 processing elements which c a n b e
configured dynamically to form either a
redundant computing m o d u l e or a
s h a r e d - b u s multiprocessor system. T h e
processing elements c o m m u n i c a t e with
e a c h other via a redundant n o d e bus.
C o m p o n e n t s of a n o d e (as s h o w n in
Figure 3) include a g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e
microprocessor, a n input/output system,
a n d b u s controller subsystems.T h e n u m b e r of processing elements n e e d e d at
e a c h n o d e d e p e n d s o n the reliability
a n d fault-tolerance requirements. A
n o d e h a s two operational m o d e s : fault
tolerant a n d multiprocessing. For n o n critical tasks, a n o d e ’s processors c a n b e
configured as a s h a r e d - b u s multiprocessor system. For critical tasks, the
n o d e ’s processors execute the s a m e task
synchronously a n d u s e a voting proced u r e to m a s k out the effect of faulty
processors. T h e coordinator processor
(P,), which is c h o s e n from the set of
fault-free processors according to a p r e defined selection procedure, supervises
the voting algorithm a n d c o m m u n i c a tion with other nodes.
Hierarchicalpermanentmemory. P e r m a n e n t m e m o r y provides secure data
storage for the state of a n o d e a n d a n y
other information relevant to the execution of a transaction. Consequently,
it is possible to c o m m i t the transaction
atomically or u n d o all its actions s h o u l d
that transaction b e aborted. P e r m a n e n t
m e m o r y c a n b e i m p l e m e n t e d using m a g netic or semiconductor technology. Figu r e 4 s h o w s the organization of the hierarchical p e r m a n e n t m e m o r y ( H P M ) ,
which uses a semiconductor p e r m a n e n t
m e m o r y ( S P M ) at the first level a n d
magnetic p e r m a n e n t m e m o r y ( M P M )
at the s e c o n d level. T h e S P M contains
two battery-backup R A M units, a c o m parator unit, a n d several b u s interface
units. T h e M P M consists of d u a l m a g netic disks a n d a comparator.
In the p r o p o s e d H P M , the S P M acts
as a buffer b e t w e e n the coordinator processor of a n o d e a n d the M P M ; as a
result, the H P M unit’s effective access
tim e is reduced. T h e coordinator processor of a n o d e updates the S P M atomically according to the following procedure:
COMPUTER

(1) After obtaining a majority consensus on the data to be committed, the
coordinator processor places the data
on the node bus with a write signal.
(2) The values from the bus are written into the two semiconductor memories simultaneously.
(3) The comparator module immediately reads back and compares the updated locations.
(4) If the values differ, an abort signal is sent to the coordinator processor
via the node bus indicating that the
values need to be rewritten. This process can be repeated up to a predefined
number of times before an error signal
is generated. If the comparison operation produces a match, then the updated values are committed and an appropriate signal is sent to the coordinator
processor.
Figure 5 is a flowchart describing an
atomic write operation. Error detection
and correction codes can also be used to
increase the reliability and simplify the
diagnosis of the memory system. However, coding techniques alone cannot
provide fault tolerance against crashes
of memory devices. A similar procedure is used for a read operation. In
addition to the fault-tolerance capability hierarchical permanent memory provides, its use also improves the performance of recovery protocols.
Cluster coordinator and gateway. For
each set of nodes forming a cluster (C,),
there is a node designated as the cluster
coordinator (C,). The nodes of a cluster
are ordered in a predetermined priority
list so that any fault-free node knows
the procedure for selecting the C, node.
The C, node periodically receives status
messages from the nodes in its cluster.
Also, the C, supervises the recovery
procedure when one of its nodes is in a
crashed state. A cluster’s gateway forwards all messages routed to nonlocal
nodes through the gateways connected
to the intercluster communication link.
The remote gateways pick up the messages addressed to one of their nodes.
Selective fault-tolerance
capability.
Redundancy and fault-tolerant
algorithms are used to ensure atomic execution of critical tasks and system recovery when faults occur. For example,
updating a bank account is a critical
task, and its execution should be controlled by a commit protocol. In this
June 1992

Node bus

Figure 4. Hierarchical

permanent memo] rY*

case, the critical operations are those
that update the bank accounts. However, there are other operations that do
not affect the system consistency requirements (reading a set of records,
searching the database, etc.), so they do
not need a commit protocol to control
their execution.
Since critical operations constitute
only a small part of all the operations,
redundancy in the architecture can be
exploited
to improve performance
through parallel processing. However,
for a node to operate in two modes redundant mode and multiprocessing
mode-the
system should provide techniques for reconfiguration.
Support for two processing modes is
provided by monitors. A monitor is a
layer of software embedded above the
operating system. The tasks are represented using a graph whose nodes represent computational
structures and
whose arcs represent the dependency
constraints between the computations.
Critical tasks are distinguished from
noncritical tasks using system primitives
and semantics of the computation. The
monitor maintains a queue of ready tasks
that can be executed concurrently as
soon as a processor is available. The
monitor schedules the tasks in a first-in,
first-out manner. However, scheduling

Abort

Same
Commit

Figure 5. An atomic write operation.

must incorporate execution of critical
tasks, since they require all the processors on a node.
Two scheduling schemes can be used
for scheduling critical tasks. The first
uses preemptive scheduling in which a
critical task to be scheduled preempts
all other tasks. When the monitor rec55

ognizes that the next task is critical, it
preempts the tasks on other processors.
In the second scheme, the monitor waits
for all current tasks to complete before
scheduling a critical task, and it does
not schedule any noncritical tasks during that period, even if processors are
available. The first scheme has the advantage that critical tasks are completed as soon as possible. But the overhead
of preempting tasks can be significant
because the state of all the current processesmust be saved. The second scheme
does not require saving the states of the
current processes, but the processors
may remain idle for a long period, reducing utilization and throughput.
Distributed voting algorithm. In our
analysis, we assume that a faulty pro-

cessor either stops producing data (failstop model) or produces corrupted data
that the voting algorithm can recognize
and use as a symptom of a faulty processor. Processor faults can be caused by a
malfunction of its hardware and/or software. A processor can assume only two
states: faulty or fault free. During the
fault-tolerance
mode of operation, a
node’s processors are configured to execute the same task (static redundancy)
and the system memory is reconfigured
as a hierarchical permanent memory. A
coordinator processor (PC) is associated
with each node. The PC supervises the
distributed voting algorithm and commits the tasks’ execution. Selection of
the P, follows a predefined procedure.
For example, if each processor is identified by a number (ID), then PC can be

selected as the fault-free processor with
the maximum ID value.
Figure 6 describes the voting algorithm and related procedures for distributed voting in the FTODS environment.
Each processor P, computes a result (or
a set of results) that must be voted on
before it can be committed. The functions used to compute these results depend on the application transactions. In
phase 1, these results are computed and
each Pi participating in the distributed
computation broadcasts its results on
the node bus using the broadcast primitive. Phase 2 involves voting on the result and determines whether the result
can be committed. Each Pi receives the
values from all other Pi’s and independently determines the confidence in the
values by comparing them.

Each Pi in a node does the f&owing, (15 i 5 n)
1. vote = function (“parameters”) /*computation de-pends on the appiication*/
2. broadcast (“node”, vote, P-name) /*broadcast “vote” to all proc&sors (P-name) in “node”*/

/*Each Pi does the foliowinf
vote01 = recv,msg (Pi, vo te, P-name) 1 I j I n, j f i /*rec. vote from all processors*/
If (vote[i] = voteb]) Ff, 1 i i, j r; PI
begin
result = vote[i]; &es&# contains vote to be committed*/
vote-commit (“all”); /*vote commit with param *all”*/
end;
else if (voteM = votetn) for at least k votes s.t. k r [n/21
begin
result = v?te of maj@y; I*resuit contains value of the majority*/
if ((Pi = PC) -and. (votefil f result)) /*if current coordinator not in majority*/
select-coordinator @$ e majority); /*select new coorditiator*l
vote-commit (“rmajority”); /*commit the majority value*/
if (P, = P,)
local-recovery (for all P, not in majority); /*start recovery of processors not in majority*/
end,
else I*no majority *I
b&
Pi (status) = lacal_ctiegnostic (Pi), 1 S i s n /*start local diagnostics*/
if (Pi (status) = “okay”)
begin
select-coordinator (“node”); /*select new coordinator from “okay” processors*/
if (Pi = PC) /*new coordinator does the following*/
vote,tzmMt (new-majority); /*commit new majority*/
end;
else if (P< (status) _ _-If , .,,- - _-.-. --‘r _---------_.-- ---print (“comp&~ node failure, external recov&-y requi&d”);
end.
Figure 6. The distributed
56

voting algorithm.
COMPUTER

There can be three possible outcomes
of this comparison. First, all values match
with each other - a complete consensus. In this case, the coordinator processor P, broadcasts the result to all P,‘s.
Each P, acknowledges by sending a
broadcast acknowledge message, and
the result is written in the permanent
memory.
In the second outcome, only a majority is obtained on the result and the
values of some P,‘s do not agree with
that of the majority. In this case, there
are two groups of processors, those belonging to the majority and those that
don’t. Since a majority is sufficient to
commit a new value, the distributed
voting algorithm (DVA) is executed such
that it uses the majority result as the
correct one. If the current coordinator
is part of the majority, it coordinates the
current DVA and initiates a recovery
procedure for the P,‘s in the minority. If
the current coordinator is not in the

majority, then the P,‘s belonging to the
majority select a new coordinator using
the “select-coord()”
procedure. This
new coordinator now coordinates commit and recovery for the minority processors.
In the third outcome, a majority is not
obtained. This triggers the “self-diagnostic()” procedure associated with each
P,. The self-diagnostic procedure returns
the status of each processor as either
“okay” or “failed” (actually, obtaining
anything other than “okay” implies
“failed”). If none of the processors return a status “okay,” the node (all II
processors in the node) is considered
“failed.” This requires external recovery, which the cluster coordinator will
perform as part of the distributed node
recovery algorithm. If some P,‘s are okay
after the self-diagnostic procedure, they
broadcast their status and then select a
new coordinator from this new set. Voting is repeated for the new set, and the

recovery procedure is initiated for other Pi’s.
Distributed node recovery algorithm.
One node is designated as the cluster
coordinator (C,) for each cluster. Selection of the C, follows a predefined procedure similar to that used in selecting
the P, of a node.
Figure 7 describes the distributed node
recovery algorithm. Each PC of a node
periodically broadcasts a status message on the local broadcast medium.
The current C, checks the status of all
node coordinators. If any node is crashed
and does not send a status message to
the C,, the C, copies the state of that
node as well as the node’s task-queue.
It then assigns these tasks to other nodes
in the cluster, choosing nodes with the
minimum load. If a node that crashed
earlier has recovered and sends an
“okay” message to the C,, the C, updates its own record to reflect this

Each PC, (node coordinator) in a cluster does the following, (15 i I m)
Forever do /*periodically*/
broadcast (LLcluster”, ststus, PC)/*broadcast “status” to all node coordinators in the cluster*/
I&The cluster coordinator is one of the node coordinators*/
recv,msg (PC,, status, P-name) 1 5 j I rn, j # i /*rec. status from all node coordinators*/
If (PC, = C,) /*if I am the cluster coordinator*/
begin
For (i = 1 tom) do /*check status of all nodes*/
If (status (PC,) f “okay”) /*any failed node?*/
begin
state = Read (PC,, state-block) /*read the state of Pci from its I-IPM*/
task-queue = Read (PC,, task-queue) /*Obtain the tasks of PC,*/
Pq = select (m&load, cluster) /*choose a node with minimum load currently*/
Send (PC+,state) /*copy state of crashed node to the chosen node*/
Send (PC, task-queue) /*assign tasks to the new node*/
ret,status (PcJ = failed /*record this with C,*/
recover (PC,) /*recover the crashed node by copying updated information*/
/*this recovery may not always be possible if the failed node’s hardware needs to be replaced (i.e., if catastrophic
failure oecurred)*I
end;
else if ((status (PC,) = okay) -and. (ret-status (PC,) = failed)) /*PC, was repaired but record was not*/
ret-status (Pci) = okay /*update C, record*/
end,
else if (PC, f C,> /*if I am not the cluster coordinator*/
if (status (C,) f “okay”) /*the cluster coordinator failed*/
select-ciuster-coordinatoro; /*select new cluster coordinator*/
end.
Figure 7. The distributed
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node recovery algorithm.
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Procedure vote-commit (parameter: set-processor);
/*set-processor: a list of processors that are fault-free, e.g. all, majority etc.*/
if (Pi = PC) /*if E am the coordinator*/
begin
broadcast (“set-processor”, result, P-name); /*reliable broadcast result to processors in “set-processor”*/
k = II set,processot II; I*cardinality of set-processor*/
forj=ltok
tecv,msg (Pr E setsrocessor, beast-ack, P-name); /*rev. acknowledgment from processor in
set-processor*/
exit;
end,
else if ((Pi r PJ -and. (Pi Q set-processor)) /*other than coordinator processor*/
begin
recv-msg (PC, result, P-name); /*rec. result from coordinator*/
beast-a& (PC, P-same); /*acknowledge to the coordinator*/
end;
return;
end vote-commit.
Procedure select,mrdinator (parameter: set-processor);
if (my-node (status) = “okay”)
begin
broadcast (set-processor, status, P-name); /*broadcast status*/
recv-msg (set-processor, status, P-name); /*rec. status from other processor*/
if (my-node = max (set-processor)) /*e.g. largest node-id */
mynode = P,; /*I am new coordinator*/
end;
return;
end select-coordinator
Figure 8. Some procedures used in the distributed

change. If other node coordinators do
not receive a status message from the
C,, that is, if the C, itself failed, then
node coordinators select a new C, following a procedure similar to that for
selecting a node coordinator (see Figure 8). Once a new C, is selected, it
repeats the above procedure to check
for node failures.
Implementation issues. The architectural support provided by the computing modules of fault-tolerant open distributed systems supports the trend
toward open distributed systems. In
FTODS, each computing module of a
node has its own operating system and a
runtime system that includes the distributed voting algorithm, the distributed node recovery algorithm, and the
monitor (to schedule tasks and switch
them between the two modes of operation, and to do other housekeeping
tasks). The fault-tolerance, concurrency control, and redundancy management
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voting algorithm.

algorithms use standard protocols and
are implemented at the application layer as application service elements. In
this environment, development of reliable applications is significantly easier
because they are not concerned with
implementing the fault-tolerance, concurrency, and recovery techniques; these
techniques are provided to the applications as services by an A S E such as the
CCR protocol.
We can better understand this architectural support by studying the main
steps incurred during execution of a
standard two-phase commit protocol
(such as the CCR protocol). For example, to execute a transaction atomically,
the master node running this transaction broadcasts a message (C-Begin) to
all nodes involved in the transaction
execution, indicating the beginning of
an atomic execution. Since the underlying communication structure of FTODS
supports broadcasting, we expect the
transfer of the C-Begin message to be

efficient. Once the C-Begin message is
received at each slave node, the monitor switches to the fault-tolerant mode
of operation, stores the system state in
the hierarchical permanent memory, and
checks the possibility of running the
actions associated with the transaction.
If an action can run successfully, the
slave node sends an “okay” message
(C-Prepare); otherwise, it sends a “failure” status message (C-Refuse).
Redundant execution of actions in
the fault-tolerant mode, use of the distributed voting algorithm with provision to recover by itself, and use of twolevel permanent
memory will all
contribute to improved performance,
reliability, and fault tolerance. In the
second phase, if the master node receives a C-Prepare message from all
the slave nodes, it commits the transaction by broadcasting the C-Commit message; otherwise, it broadcasts the CRollback message. Also, tasks in this
phase will complete quickly because the
COMPUTER

proposed architecture
supports the
broadcast capability and the rollback
procedure.
We believe that providing architectural support at the node level and using
standard protocols will significantly simplify the development of reliable distributed applications, thereby making
open distributed systems an attractive
computing environment.

Reliability
FTODS

N,-1

R, (N,) = C x Rbus c

rNn-f (1 - r)’

f=O
(1)

analysis of

Node reliability. Assume that r represents the reliability of each processor
for a given period of time T. This reliability measure should take into account
the failures caused by hardware as well
as by software. Detailed Markovian
methods can be used to predict the combined reliability measure that takes into
consideration hardware faults and software errors - for example, design errors related to system overloads, overflow/underflow of queues, etc. Assume
also that a processor failure is exponentially distributed with a failure rate h.
Let the number of processors in a node
be N,, and f denote the number of faulty
processors at a given time t. Depending
on the number of faults, the distributed
voting algorithm uses different procedures, as follows:
Case 1: Number of faultsf 5 rN,/21. In
this case, a majority vote is attainable
and the results obtained by the faulty
processors can be masked out concurrently by the coordinator processor without any extra delay.
Case 2: Number of faults rN,,/2i If I
N, - 1. In this case, the majority of
processors are faulty. However, there is
at least one fault-free processor that
can be identified by the diagnostic routines. This processor ensures reliable
execution of the tasks assigned to its
node, but with a time penalty that results from invoking the local diagnostic
procedures.
Cuse3: Number of faults f = N,. In this
case, all processors of a node are faulty;
consequently, the node is in a failed
state. The cluster coordinator invokes
the distributed node recovery procedure to start a higher level recovery
procedure, as previously described.
Node reliability can thus be defined
as the probability of the node’s being in
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either case 1 or case 2, that is, f 5 N,, - 1.
The expression for node reliability is
obtained by computing the probability
that at least one processor is operating
successfully and is given by

is the binomial factor and is given by
N,,!

(Nn-f)!f!
In the above expression, the term
rNn -1 denotes the probability of having
N,, - f fault-free processors, while (1 - ry
denotes the probability of having f faulty
processors. The

pends on the techniques used to detect,
mask, locate, and repair faults, and to
reconfigure and recover from the effects of a failure. The methods used to
predict coverage are therefore based on
assumptions about the expected behavior of faults and how they are handled
once they occur. Dugan and Trivedi5
presented several methods for predicting the coverage factor for different
types of error behavior assumptions. In
FTODS, a distributed voting algorithm
is used to detect faulty processors and
to mask their errors dynamically. Therefore, no recovery is needed as long as a
majority vote can be obtained (case 1).
Also, this algorithm uses a redundant
system bus for comparing the results
obtained by the processors. Since there
is no single point of failure in the FTODS
architecture and in the fault-tolerant
algorithms, the coverage C is expected
to be high; in this analysis it is assumed
to be 1.
A node’s mean time to failure can
also be evaluated from the above expression (Equation 2) by integrating
the node reliability expression:
MT-IF = j’,Y;Rn

f 1
(NH
denotes the number of combinations in
which there are f faulty processors chosen from N,, in a node. If the coverage
factor is equal to one, the node can be
viewed as a parallel redundant system
with a redundancy level of N,, Node
reliability
can be evaluated as (1 (1 - r)Nn).
Node reliability can be expressed with
respect to time, if we assume that the
processors fail according to an exponential distribution function with a failure rate h. Consequently, node reliability at a given time t is given by

(exp-‘)Nn-f(l-exp-h’)f

(2)
Coverage C is an important parameter,
and system reliability is extremely sensitive to its value. The coverage factor
reflects the system’s ability to recover
automatically from a fault once it occurs during normal operation. It de-

To measure the reliability improvement
as a result of introducing redundancy,
we define a measure called the reliability improvement
factor (RIF). This
measure describes the relative increase
in reliability for using N,, redundant processors to the maximal possible increase
in reliability. Let’s assume that R,,(l)
denotes the simplex reliability of a node.
The maximal increase in reliability is
obtained when R,(l) is increased to 1.
The RIF for a given redundancy level
(N,,) is computed as
RIF = R,(NJ-R,(l)
l-R,(l)
Figure 9 shows the RIF obtained for
three different levels of redundancy (3,
4, and 5). In this analysis, the reliability
of a simplex bus is assumed to be a
constant and equal to 0.95, because we
are interested in studying the effect of
redundancy level on node reliability. It
is clear that more than 95 percent of
the possible reliability improvement can
be achieved when four processors are
used. However, a triple modular redundancy configuration (level 3) could
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if we apply the Syrel algorithm,6 TR can
be given as

+ rlr4r5q3 + rlr4r6w5

+ r2r3r59,

+ rzr3r6wh + r2r4r5w3+ r2r4r69d3951
where qi denotes the unreliability
of
node i and is equal to (1 - r,).
A transaction’s reliability can be increased by introducing redundancy so
that its actions can be executed on several processors. Redundant execution
of actions can be performed on processors located at remote nodes, all at one
node, or a combination of these two
cases. For the network shown in Figure
10, the transaction reliability is analyzed for the following three cases:

Figure 9. The effect of redundancy level on node reliability.

be sufficient for situations in which
the processor’s initial reliability is high.
The same analysis can be used to measure the improvement in the MTTF
when different redundancy levels are
used.
Reliability analysis of an atomic transaction. Let T denote a transaction with
a collection of iz actions, that is, T = a,,
a2,..., a,, where a, represents an action
to run on a node.
The set of nodes that run the actions
of a given transaction (T) and the set of
links connecting them form a tree referred to in CCR protocol as an atomic
action tree. An AAT is assumed operational when all its components (nodes
and links) are operational.
Figure 10 shows a transaction consisting of three actions a,, a2, and a, in which
each action can run redundantly on two
nodes of a cluster. In this example, ac60

tion a, can run on node x, or xZr a, can
run on node xj or x.,, and a3 can run on x5
or x6, Because of this redundancy, eight
possible trees can be used to run this
transaction:
AAT,=x
AAT,

AAT,=x

4

x 9 x b, x 4 x gl x gz x g3 xxx
1 3

5

=xb,Xb2Xb~Xb4Xg,Xg2Xg~X1X3X6
4

x b, x b, x b4 x 81 x gz x gi xxx
1 4

5

AAT4=xqXb~Xb,Xb~~g,~gZXg,X1x4X6

AAT,=x

4

x bz x 4 x b4 x 81 x gz x a xxx
2 3

5

~~~6=xqxb~Xb~Xba,Xg,XgzXg~X2X3X6

AAT,=x
AAT,=x

4
k

x 9 x b3 x b4 x g, x gz x a xxx
2 4
x b, x b, x b4 x gi x gz x 83 xxx
2 4

5
6

Transaction reliability (TR) can be
defined as the conditional probability
that at least one of these trees is operational. The literature is rich with algorithms to evaluate this probability, and

Case I: Execution of redundant actions at remote nodes. In this case, each
node has only one processor and the
actions are executed on remote nodes.
Concurrency control and redundancy
management are complicated because
of the remote distribution of the redundant computations.
Case 2: Execution of redundant actions at local nodes. In this case, each
node has four redundant processors that
can concurrently execute an action of T.
Since all of the redundant computations run on the processors of the same
node, concurrency control and redundancy management are simplified significantly.
Case 3: Execution of redundant actions on remote redundant nodes. This
is a combination of the first two cases.
Figure 11 shows the transaction reliability for these three cases. Note that
the transaction reliability for the second case is better than that of case 1.
However, case 2 has twice as many redundant processors as case 1. Furthermore, there is no significant improvement in reliability for case 3 over case 2
in spite of the fact that case 3 uses twice
the redundancy of case 2. Moreover,
the algorithms needed to achieve concurrency control and redundancy management in case 3 are more complicated
than those of case 2 because the redundant actions run on both local and remote nodes.
From this analysis, we can conclude
that replicating the computations locally represents a cost-effective solution
that maximizes reliability and also simCOMPUTER

plifies the algorithms required to achieve
recovery and consistency control. In
FTODS, the computing modules are
designed to provide architectural support to run transactions in a configuration similar to that described in case 2.

T

he computing modules of the
proposed FTODS support an
efficient
implementation
of
fault-tolerant
algorithms. The use of
static redundancy within each node guarantees fault tolerance and reliable execution of critical tasks. Furthermore,
the use of local diagnostic routines to
identify faulty components reduces the
complexity of recovery algorithms significantly. alongwith trafficon the communications network, since these functions are executed using the processors
available at a node. In transaction-processing-based distributed systems, permanent memory is required for achieving atomic transactions. In FTODS, the
permanent memory is designed as a twolevel hierarchy with semiconductor technology used in the first level and magnetic technology in the second. Providing
semiconductor permanent memory improves performance significantly because transactions can be committed
much faster than by accessing magnetic
disks. H

Figure 10. An example of a transaction execution.
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